Security

The safest class of Uniswap v4 hook

Wyrm hooks belong to the safest class of Uniswap v4 hook. They are immutable and hold none of the return-delta permissions that would let a hook change swap amounts or move value during a trade. A Wyrm hook validates a pool when it is created and sets the fee before each swap, nothing more. Your liquidity stays non-custodial throughout. It rests in the Uniswap v4 PoolManager, your share is recorded by the hook, and you can withdraw it whenever you want. See Managing Positions.

Principal is out of reach

Wyrm is non-custodial and LP principal is out of anyone's reach. The contracts have a single path that pays out principal: your own withdraw, to the address you choose. No admin function can reach position funds, nobody but you can burn your shares, and withdrawals cannot be paused or gated by anything.

The contracts are immutable, and the only lever admin keys hold over a position is fees, hard-capped in bytecode: on today's markets the swap fee ceiling is 2% or lower. Worst case from a fully compromised team key: mispriced fees within those caps. Principal is untouchable.

Reviewed with AI security tooling

Through development the contracts were checked continuously with leading security tools: Olympix for AI-driven analysis (access granted by Uniswap Labs), Sherlock AI review, and the open-source pashov ai-web3-security hub, on top of unit, fuzz and invariant test suites.

Built on audited foundations

Wyrm hooks build on the third-party-audited hook architecture of Alphix.

Verify what is deployed

Every Wyrm hook is source-verified on the block explorer. Use Contracts to inspect code, bytecode, transactions and AccessManager state. Check the exact hook for the market: v4 pool identifiers do not have standalone contract addresses.

Responsible disclosure

Do not post an unpatched vulnerability or proof of concept in a public channel. Reach the team privately through the official Discord before sharing technical details.

Price movement and inactive liquidity

Swaps leave a position with less of the relatively rising asset and more of the falling one. It can underperform holding the original assets, become one-sided, and stop earning after price crosses a boundary. Dynamic fees are compensation for taking trading risk, not a guarantee that compensation exceeds the loss.

Contract and pooled-ledger defects

The hook is immutable. A defect cannot be patched in place. A ledger-accounting error can affect every holder sharing a range or market.

Administrator and key risk

Authorised roles can change pool configuration, set a claim fee, post reward roots, pause expanding actions and operate temporary fee overrides. Delays and bytecode bounds limit these powers. A compromised keeper can still misprice fees inside its band until an override is cleared or expires, and a bad Merkle root can allocate rewards incorrectly within its cap.

Model, reference data, and keeper risk

A calendar can miss an exceptional closure. A reference price can be stale, manipulated or unavailable. A volatility model can be miscalibrated. A stopped keeper falls back to the autonomous fee, which may be too low or high for the event that caused the outage. Caps limit magnitude, not economic loss.

Points and reward settlement risk

Points, referrals and creator rewards depend on off-chain indexing and policy inputs. Rate limits can delay publication; bugs or excluded activity can lead to corrections; a programme can be paused or changed under its Terms. A displayed point is not an on-chain entitlement.

Token and issuer risk

A tokenised equity is not the underlying share. Its value depends on its issuer, redemption arrangements and transfer controls. An issuer can restrict addresses, pause transfers or change mechanics. Other tokens may have no backing. A different payout recipient can help with an address-specific blocklist but cannot defeat a token-wide halt.

Chain, RPC, and interface risk

Robinhood Chain can stop, reorganise or reject transactions. RPCs and indexers can show stale or unavailable data. The hosted site can be wrong, inaccessible or geofenced. A contract withdrawal path that ignores admin pause is useful only when the chain and token transfer are functioning and the user can submit a valid transaction.

Withdrawal is not a swap

Withdrawing returns the assets currently held by the range and does not itself trade them. Converting those assets afterwards is a separate swap that can pay a fee and move price. Check pool depth and expected output before that conversion.

Before depositing

The complete position can be lost. This page is a structured summary, not an exhaustive risk list or financial advice. Read the Terms of Service, issuer materials and contract state, and use only assets and contracts you have independently verified.